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by 
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Force is essential to maintain South Africa's inequitable racist system. The dominant 
White group has been able to sustain itself in power because it has consciously 
monopolized control of the coercive instruments of the state. For White South 
Africans, the raw nerve of the "colour question1' - who dominates in inter-group 
terms - is exposed by the emotional spectre of well trained and well armed Black 
soldiers in the country. Through the years has emerged an implicit doctrine that 
Blacks should not be armed. In reality, this doctrine is as much myth as it is 
reality. 
Before and since the establishment of Union government, selected Blacks have 
been variously employed in armed defence of the status quo. Yet prejudices against 
arming Blacks varied'in intensity with time and with the situation. In the end, the 
use of Blacks was contingent upon the experiences of the Government in question, the 
perceived gravity of the security threat, and upon the opportunities Whites saw to 
exploit prevailing political/military divisions among and within population groups. 
The present situation is a classic policy dilemma. Whites want to maintain 
and defend their material advantages and political/social privileges. But the 
demographic realities of a rapidly growing Black population, coupled with mounting 
Black restiveness and undeniable isolation of the White government, require that 
larger costs be borne to defend the order. Continually inflating defence budgets, 
national compulsory military training for all White males between 18 and 25, plus 
post-service Citizen Force and reserve obligations, cause much resentment and economic 
dislocation. 
By the early 1970s there was hardly a White politician of national stature 
who had not fallen in with the prevailing viewpoint that the defence of South Africa 
should involve all population groups, and that larger numbers of Blacks would have to 
be brought into the armed forces. White resistance to a deeper defence involvement of 
other population groups has broken down, partly because of government's cautious 
phasing in of Black fighting forces in the diverse units and formations devised for 
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those purposes. Experiences in Namibia, Portuguese Africa, and Zimbabwe must have 
had their effects, too. The sum total of arguments in favour of the governmentrs 
proposed course weighs heavily in the debate. It might be helpful to review them 
here. 
First have been a battery of manpower considerations, particularly as they 
affect the economy and the defensive capacity of the regime, but also in terms of 
evolving domestic race relations. Look at population growth trends by race. Look at 
the shortages in skilled and experienced personnel in industry and on the mines. Add 
to this the threat of internal unrest and the possibility of external invasion, and 
the manpower bow is drawn all the more taut. Yet the manpower recipe is not so simple. 
As long as Blacks continue to serve in "traditional" (i.e. menial) military roles, 
control is easy. But there is a qualitative difference between Blacks performing 
quasi-economic roles in the defence establishment and Blacks assuming combat, and 
even supervisory and command, responsibilities. Control may still be possible, 
depending on structure, deployment and dozens of other variables, but is no longer 
automatic. Important tactical and combative skills that heretofore had been the legal 
monopoly of the dominant group are being transmitted (on a small scale) to individual 
Blacks. It takes a leap of faith, an act of desperation, or an exercise in arrogance 
for the South African power structure to move in these directions. 
Manpower concerns alone did not carry debate. So far, the use of Blacks in 
defence has been more symbolic than numerically significant. Other arguments must be 
explored. Perhaps as popular has been what can be labelled the domestic political 
argument. It holds that maintaining order in a racially heterogeneous society demands 
that all groups must stand together. Superficially, how better to convince people 
that their defence and security are bound up with yours, and that you have confidence 
in their commitment, than to bring them into the defensive arm of the state. 
This links up with another theme - the need for South Africa to erase the 
image of a "White regime" excluding the Black majority. We are told that the struggle 
in southern Africa is not a race war, but a battle between Western civilization and 
the forces of destructive communism. What must be created is a defence force that is 
"truly representative of the whole population". What is particularly naive in this 
type of thinking is that South African officials assume that the West will applaud the 
greater use of Blacks without looking deeper into the underlying purposes for which 
those steps are being taken. South African Blacks are not so credulous. In so far as 
the enlistment of Blacks is designed to deflect Western criticism and thereby reduce 
pressures for genuine shifts in the power structure, the West should not be fooled. 
Plenty of politicians and some military men regard Black military units chiefly as 
public relations gestures. For both domestic and foreign policy purposes, a multi- 
racial armed force is favoured, &, and this should be emphasized, as a first choice, 
but because it is seen to have become a political, military and/or economic necessity. 
Other politicians speak of the inequities of having only Whites bearing the 
burden of defence. Other economic and social considerations (besides manpower), such 
as unemployment, job training and social reform, also are injected in the debate. The 
Nationalist government does not want to take the public position that the SADF is 
trying to bring about back-door social reform. They perceive that their own 
constituents will not buy such a policy. There is a body of opinion, entrenched in 
higher levels of Defence Headquarters, that perceives of the SADF as the vanguard of 
social reform in South Africa, a catalyst for South African society. They encourage 
the regime to abandon rigid apartheid and to make the transition to some institutions 
predicated on merit. For the Defence hierarchy, it is a self-assured plea for 
meritocracy. They know that the transition would be slow and the advantage will 
always lie with those who establish the standards and judge performance. They also 
realize that it cannot run its logical course without jeopardizing the regime. 
What resistance there is to these views in Parliament comes largely from the 
Nationalist right wing. Such spokesmen pose not so much a challenge but more like a 
restraining hand, a counsel of hesitation, of prudence. If there is one characteristic 
of the Government's move to the military use of Blacks it has been caution. Nothing 
has been rushed. At each stage the gmund has been carefully prepared. 
In a way, the movement to Black forces began in two units peripheral to the 
central issue. The first preliminary use of Blacks was strictly not a SADF matter, but 
none the less contributed to a willingness to train Blacks for war. I refer to the 
South African Police (SAP), which for years has had large numbers of Blacks in the 
ranks, almost 50 per cent. The police are a national organization with para-military 
structure and preparation. SAP is regaxded as "the first line of defence in the event 
of internal unrestff. Its members are trained in infantry drill and combat and in riot 
control, as well as in the conventional police skills. Some undergo counter-insurgency 
training. There has been a close security collaboration between the SAP and the SADF. 
DeSence Department White Papers repeatedly refer to the responsibility "to give 
immediate support to the SA Police in the maintenance of internal law and orderff. (1) 
Likewise, SAP is prepared to support and has supported SADF in protecting the territory 
from external incursion, both in South Africa and in N d b i a  and Zimbabwe. The line 
between police and military duties is fuzzy in South Africa. The extensive use of 
armed Black police has, in effect, made foolish earlier protestations that Blacks ought 
not to be armed for defence purposes. They already had been armed, to an extent, albeit 
under obviously controlled conditions. 
The second step towards the military use of Blacks began in 1963. In April 
that year, the Cape Corps Auxiliary Service was replaced by a new unit named The 
Coloured Corps, to be an integral part of the Permanent Force. At first Corps personnel 
were unarmed non-combatants, serving in roles similar to those of the Corps in World 
War 11. The "dilution" policy of dispersing Coloured Corps personnel to White units of 
the Permanent Force was resurrected. Two years later, Coloured recruits were accepted 
into the Navy. 
To assuage anticipated White opposition, the Minister specified that Corps 
members would neither be trained in nor used for combat. But they were given firearms 
instruction, confined to single-shot small arms for self-defence and guard duty. In 
addition, the Military Discipline Code enacted in 1957 was amended so that a Coloured 
soldier would always be junior to a White soldier, even if he should outrank his White 
colleague. (2) At that time, however, the highest rank to which a Corps man could 
aspire was Warrant Officer I in the Navy and Staff Sergeant (1st class) in the Army. 
A significant shift in structure was instituted in 1972. It had become 
apparent that y o w  Coloured men with the requisite educational stand.ards were not being 
attracted in sufficient numbers. The approved establishment as of 1 April 1965 was to 
be 527. Fewer than 100 were attested. Economic inducements were not appealing. Status 
was marginal. The SACC was unable to maintain itself at approved force levels. The 
SACC tended to attract "up-country peopleff. By 1971 only 430 of the 627 posts were 
filled (68 per cent) and only 50 per cent of the 248 Permanent Force posts for the SACC 
in the Navy were filled. Two changes sought to rectify these problems. 
First, the name of the Corps was changed to the SA Cape Corps, the respected 
name of the Coloured units serving in the World Wars. Continuity had officially been 
sanctioned. Second, in July 1972 Minister P. W. Botha announced the formation of a 
Special Service Battalion for Coloureds associated with the Cape Corps. The SSB (now 
called the SACCB) is also voluntary, but with a difference. It was established as a 
form of national service for Coloureds. At the end of their training members of the 
SSB are given the choice of re-entering civilian life without any further military 
obligation, or of joining the Permanent Force. The SACC now consists of the SACCB for 
the volunteers (an infantry battalion), a logistics unit (SACC Maintenance unit), and 
the Cape Corps School. (3) The latter unit represents the first Black officers training 
facility. Other Permanent Force members of the SACC might go on for specialist training 
(paratroop, military police, etc.) and find themselves in various White units. There 
are also several post-service options for Coloureds within the SADF. 
Overall, the 1972 changes had marked effects on Coloured military service. 
As options widened, recruitment picked up. Larger and larger intakes were enrolled. 
The Corps advanced from a 32 per cent vacancy rate in April 1972 to a waiting list of 
several hundred in the late 1970s. The January 1980 intake numbered about 1,400. 
Greater selectivity is now possible and "eliteft status is ballyhooed. The 1980 force 
levels can be put at, at least, 3,100 in all services, with around 1,600 in the 
Permanent Force and around 1,500 in preparatory national service. 
In the last few years the idea of compulsory military service for Blacks, 
and especially for Coloureds and Indians, has been mooted, and by elements closer and 
closer to Government. (4) But certain practical problems make such a programme 
difficult. First, how would government reconcile compulsory military service for 
selected groups of Blacks with the absence of full citizenship rights for these same 
groups. Does one achieve rights by denying service first until full citizenship is 
accorded, or should one serve first and thereby use such a demonstration of loyalty 
as a political lever to win full political rights? The more common Coloured view has 
been the former position, no service without rights first. Outside the Coloured 
Representative Council the more tenacious view is that the position of Coloureds and 
Indians cannot be divorced from that of Black Africans. All must achieve rights first, 
before any serve militarily. Government claims that their surveys show that Coloureds 
are willing to serve, even compulsorily, as long as rights and benefits within the 
SADF are equalized. (5) Suffice to say that opinion within the Coloured community 
varies according to age, income, place of residence (i.e. rural or urban), religion 
and language. 
So far, all Coloureds in the SADF have been volunteers. A few hundred, or 
even a few thousand,out of an economically insecure population of around 2,800,000 
presents few burdens. But it is a far leap from an "elite" and selective unit to a 
compulsory and more inclusive military body. In short, the absorbtive capacity of 
the SADF would be tested. 
Voluntary service so far has implied some degree of agreement with or 
acquiescence in the political and economic status quo, or at least a more evolutionary 
approach to changing it. Could an indoctrination programme deal with recruits 
unconvinced or hostile to the system? Attempts to establish a high-school para-military 
cadet programme have so far received little sympathy in the Coloured community or among 
educators. So the technique used in the White schools to indoctrinate future national 
servicemen will not easily be transferable to the Coloured schoola. 
Not until the first intakes of the SACCSSB in 1973 were modern Coloured 
servicemen trained for combat - in counter-insurgency operations and in the use of 
automatic weapons. The step-like employment of Cape Corpsmen in Namibia also 
characterizes the empirical style of SADF. It began with Coloureds in "traditionalt1 
roles - cooks and drivers in the late 1960s and easly 1970s assigned as individuals 
"dilutedf1 to White formations. The first Coloured soldiers to see active duty as a 
combat unit since World War I were sent "up north" in September 1976. Every year since 
at least one contingent has been sent for a 3-month stint of operational duty. The 
government is keen to get effective political mileage out of these troops. 
Efforts were also made to tap Coloured leadership and supervisory potential. 
Today, most of the instructors in the SACC are Coloured. When first initiated, the 
highest rank to which a Coloured Corpsman could aspire was Warrant Officer Class I. 
Two company sergeant-majors attained this rank in June 1970. In May 1973 the Minister 
of Defence disclosed the Government's intention to allow Cape Corpsmen to become 
commissioned officers. Henceforth, he contended, advancement in the force would be 
based entirely on merit. In this important speech he also revealed that it was his 
thinking that eventually the SACC would be run entirely by Coloured officers, that 
Government intended that SSB trainees who had completed their training would be 
organized into Citizen Force units of the Corps, and that there would be no objection 
in principle to the employment of Coloured persons in any of the three m s  of the 
SADF. (6) 
Eleven officer candidates were selected and l@ months later seven emerged 
with commissions. (7) Three years later five of these seven gained promotion from 
lieutenant to captain. Three became majors in 1979. Despite these highly publicized 
examples, there has been a dearth of qualified officer candidates. Despite the 1975 
amendment to the Military Discipline Code redefining the term "superior officer" to 
equalize the legal status of all amny commissions and ranks, few really qualified 
Coloured officer candidates have applied. 
As for pay and benefits, b 1977 salary scales had been brought more into 
line although they are not equal. (87 The same is true of dependentst allowances and 
daily pay for national servicemen. Fringe benefits have been equalized while on 
operational duty. So far, it would appear that salaries and benefits are not a 
significant disincentive to enlisting at the lower levels. The present Prime Minister 
has expressed his intention to bring SADF benefits and salaries more in line among the 
races. Allowances under SADF jurisdiction alone are the same for all races serving in 
the operational area. But with salaries, Parliamentary approval and approval by the 
Public Service Commission are necessary. 
While the SADF may, at the top, be verbally committed to ending the most 
niggling forms of racial discrimination in the organization, the basic ones, segregated 
formations and an all-White command structure at the top, still apply. Inequalities 
and inequities are still part and parcel of the system. Racialist attitudes are an 
everyday part of the social regime and the military as well. Official efforts to 
underplay, suppress and transcend them, even in a disciplined military hierarchy, 
cannot eliminate racialism altogether or hope to shield Black soldiers from their 
ubiquity. The Defence Force is part of the regime it defends. A piecemeal assault 
on deeply engrained attitudes and beliefs is bound to end in frustration. 
In many regards, things done with, to and by the SACC are examined carefully 
at SADF headquarters to determine their applicability to other Black formations and 
groups. The SACC is regarded as an organizational guinea pig. The product, they 
think, is a saleable commodity - to that part of White South Africa skittish about 
arming and training Blacks for combat; somewhat less so to the Coloured citizenry 
itself, even less to the rest of the Black community, watching to see how Coloureds 
fare as a result of their identification with defending the regime; and to the outside 
world. 
Another policy contributing to the acceptance of amed Black defence forces 
was to establish and train national guards and eventually the armies for the ethnic 
c horn eland^'^. Such schemes can be rationalized as preparations for self-government 
and then foreign military assistance to neighbouring states. The same might be said 
of the formation of various ethnic military units in Namibia. From the beginning of 
such ideas, the homeland amnies were regarded as part of a larger multinational defence 
force operating in the interests of a "wider South African" defence plan. (9) South 
Africa, having lost its ring of buffer states on its border, may well see the homelands 
as an inner ring of buffer states to provide added response time given an incursion 
from the north, east or west. All the homelands occupy potentially strategic positions 
close to South Africa" borders. Their citizens also have kinsmen across the borders. 
Thus a total strategy involving the homelands in South Africa's defence is quite 
within the thinking of Pretoria. Yet military planners regard the homelands as a 
strategic nightmare. 
In 1975 the SADF began to train Black soldiers and instructors for the 
embryonic homeland governments. The United Party defence spokesman, W. V. Raw, in 
welcoming the April 1975 announcement of the formation of a Transkeian battalion, 
none the less asked the Prime Minister what agreement had been reached with the 
Transkeian Government regarding this force. He suggested a "NATO-type treaty" of 
mutual self-defence by which South Africa retained the right of access to Transkeian 
territory, and which organized the two forces under the single command of the SADF.(~O) 
Others have argued for a multilateral Monroe Doctrine not unlike the Organization of 
American States' Charter to enable the Republic to move legally into homelands' 
territory for defence purposes. (11) Still others hint at a Brezhnev doctrine of sorts. 
Transkei troops have been trained a t  Eerste Rivier i n  the Cape, beginning 
i n  August 1975, and a t  Lenz, near Johannesburg. (12) By the end of 1976 force 
strength numbered 254 soldiers  and trainees,  l ed  by 30 off icers ,  warrant of f icers  and 
men seconded by the SADF. (13) Their Commanding Officer a lso served a s  Secretary of 
Defence to  the Transkeian Government. (14) Despite the Transkeian severance of 
diplomatic and mil i tary re la t ions  with South Africa i n  1978, the South African 
Government presses on with i ts  policy, confident tha t  Transkeian opposition is  the 
annoyance of a f l e a  which w i l l  have t o  leasn the lesson dearly tha t  i t  has a symbiotic, 
i f  not dependent, existence on the South African hound. 
The other "independent" homelands, Bophuthatswana and Venda, have a l so  
accepted South African guidance f o r  mil i tary purposes. After frequent remarks by 
Bophuthatswana's now Prime Minister, Chief Lucas Mangope, tha t  Whites can expect 
Tswanas t o  help defend South Africa, i n  1976 h i s  Government asked the SADF t o  t r a i n  
Tswanas f o r  mil i tary service. By "independence" i n  December 1977, some 221 men 
(including eight commissioned off icers)  had been trained by 30 South African 
officers.  (15) 
The Namibia puzzle i s  more complicated. When it  became appasent tha t  some 
version of independence would have t o  be conferred upon Namibia, the South African 
Government, i n  seasch of a neo-colonial solution, f i r s t  decided t o  struckure tha t  
independence along ethnic l ines .  A past of t h i s  divide and dominate policy had been 
t o  follow the in s t a l l a t i on  of homeland governments with homeland police and defence 
forces. Ostensibly at the request of homeland leaders, homeland bat ta l ions were 
created and trained by the SADF, much along the l i nes  devised f o r  the Transkei. The 
f i r s t  Ovambos were recrui ted i n  1974. A Bushman Unit was formed tha t  year. By the 
end of January 1976, Minister of Defence P. W. Botha disclosed tha t  Black soldiers 
f ight ing i n  the northern border of Namibia were, i n  fac t ,  "members of the bar der m e a  
authoritiest ' .  A l l  were members of the auxiliary services ra ther  than the SADF 
Permanent Force. These presumably included Bushmen, Ovambo and Kavango bat ta l ions 
which by the end of 1976 numbered about 500 men. Although the homeland bat ta l ions 
began by being organized s t r i c t l y  on t r i b a l  l ines ,  a l l  t ra inees wear ident ical  SADF 
uniforms and Afrikaans i s  used as the medium of instruct ion and command. The SADF 
command structure applies, i n  contrast  t o  the homeland police forces,  which 
o f f i c i a l l y  are under the d i rec t  control of the homeland authorities.  (16) The t r i b a l  
un i t s  a re  t o t a l ly  under SADF control. I n  addition, the SADF organized i n  1976 a 
ba t ta l ion  composed of Angolan refugees and including some Portuguese. This secret 
un i t ,  32 Battalion, is  specif ical ly  designed f o r  "cross border" operations. It i s  
armed with captured Russion weapons and includes some Portuguese company commanders 
a s  well a s  SADF officers.  
The ethnic principle was  moved southward l a t e r  i n  1976 and 1977, with 
t raining f o r  Nama, Hereros, D m a  and Coloured uni ts .  (17) Such a device, however, 
i s  an old ploy by occupying forces - t o  claim tha t  loca l  leaders (especially those 
dependent on the occupying force) invi ted them e i ther  t o  defend them o r  to  s e t  up 
indigenous forces tha t  the outsiders controlled. A s  SADF un i t s  became unpopular i n  
the f ight ing areas of Namibia, the onus of occupation had t o  be passed along t o  the 
homeland leaders. (18) But the s h i f t  t o  homeland forces was  chief ly symbolic. The 
i n i t i a l  intake from each ethnic group was only 160, hardly suff ic ient  t o  a l t e r  the 
d r i f t  of a deter iorat ing and widening l ibera t ion  w a r .  This does not prevent them from 
serving po l i t i ca l  purposes - as  symbols of ttacceptablet' t rad i t iona l  authority,  t o  
protect  t r i b a l  chiefs,  t o  maintain order at po l i t i ca l  r a l l i e s ,  and t o  harass SWAPO 
organizers and otherwise lend assistance t o  the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance and 
other anti-revolutionary part ies .  (19) 
It became evident before long, even t o  Pretor ia ,  tha t  the Turnhalle fomula  
would not be acceptable t o  SWAPO, the Western powers, and even t o  a majority of 
Namibians. So the l i n e  was developed tha t ,  although the different  ethnic groups were 
being trained separately, eventually they would form par t  of an integrated, Namibia- 
wide defence force. Certainly i n  the way they were being deployed, i.e. anywhere i n  
the te r r i to ry ,  it was obvious tha t  recru i t s  were not being trained solely t o  bols te r  
regional homeland governments. I n  f ac t ,  they have been completely under the SADF 
command and have been deployed as i f  they were a par t  of the Defence Force i t s e l f .  (20) 
A t  f i r s t ,  o f f i c i a l  thinking involved retaining ethnic uni t s  and merely 
integrating them a t  command and strategic planning levels. Officially, the ethnic 
designations were eliminated i n  l a t e  1978, but composition i s  unchanged. The "non- 
ethnic" ethnic units ,  four of which are stationed i n  the operational area, became a 
par t  of a new South West African defence force in 1979, but the SADF remained i n  the 
driver' S seat. 
I n  August 1977, an "indigenous" force, 41 Battalion, was organized f o r  the 
ent i re  terr i tory.  (21) A few Black comandos were also established that  year. This 
was followed i n  February 1978 by the suspension of recruitment in to  the t r iba l  armies. 
It i s  claimed that  the t r i b a l  uni t s  are now U to  fill strength. The f ive  companies 
of 41 Battalion (between 400 and 600 i n  total! are composed of men from diverse ethnic 
groups, although a large number of them are Basters. I n  that  the t ransi t ional  ro le  
of the contending amned forces i s  one of the most important and contentious issues i n  
any f'uture negotiations. It i s  easy to  see th i s  move t o  a territory-wide defence 
force as  an important bargaining gambit i n  anticipation of demands that  the SADF be 
withdrawn o r  reduced i n  numbers, o r  confined to  base or to specified regions of the 
country, before independence. 
By a ser ies  of indirect steps, a t  f i r s t  limited i n  scope but significant i n  
symbolic impact, the South African Government has moved into the use of Black soldiers. 
The police, the homeland amnies, and i n  Namibia the homeland battalions followed by a 
multi-ethnic t e r r i t o r i a l  battalion, have served to break down White resistance and 
reticence to Black fighting men. These steps have also served to  neutralize some 
external criticism and opposition. The South African government thinks i t  can manage. 
By the time Chief of the Asmy L t  General Magnus Malan granted permission to  
establish the South African Army Bantu Training Centre i n  November 1973, the SADF had 
accumulated some experience with Black fighting men. In i t i a l ly ,  however, the new u n i t  
did not veer radically from past experience. F i r s t  recrui ts  came over from the Bantu 
Labour Service, and the f i r s t  advertisement touted the uni t  a s  a special guard 
formation. Through 1974 and 1975 the s tatus of the uni t  was uncleas - neither f i s h  
nor fowl - neither labourer nor soldier. Certainly, they were not t o  function as  an 
operational combat force. 
Three important changes were brought about i n  1975. F i rs t ,  Black Africans 
were f o r  the f i r s t  time e l ig ib le  to  join the Permanent Force. Second, the Bantu 
Training Centre was moved to  Lenz, i t s  current base, and was deemed then to  be self- 
sufficient.  Third, the un i t ' s  name was changed to the 21 Battalion. It was sti l l  not 
an operational bat tal ion pe r  se, l i k e  most other infantry battalions i n  the Defence 
Force, even though an operational company was formed i n  1977. Rather, i t  w a s  a 
"training school", by and large, f o r  non-combatant services. 
Until 1978 the 21 Battalion existed on an ad hoc basis. I n  tha t  year, a 
Board of Officers decided to  build the 21 Battalion into a full-fledged training 
school fo r  Black soldiers and to  involve all ethnic groups. The board also agreed 
t o  s e t  up a number of regional uni ts ,  perhaps a t  f i r s t  of company size although 
capable of growth. Each would be an operational uni t ,  decentralized and attached to  
a regional command, and thereby taking on a part icular  ethnic compsoition. I n  
regional uni ts ,  members are recruited locally, and somewhat lower qualifications apply 
then f o r  21 Battalion members. They are clearly envisioned to  be the f ight ing 
element of the SADF. So fa r ,  there i s  the 121 Battalion, attached to  the Natal 
Command and composed of Zulu, and the 111 Battalion, made up of Swazi and Shangaan 
and based i n  the eastern Transvaal. 
A t  Lenz, the f i r s t  batch of corporals were promoted i n  1977 and the f i r s t  
16 sergeants two years la ter .  Significantly, the highest ranking Blacks i n  the SADF 
are outside the regular l i ne  of command. With regard to  t raining a t  21 Battalion, 
the emphasis i s  on counter-insurgency fighting and then on specialization courses. 
I n  &id-1977, the 21 Battalion began preparing a company of 140 f o r  operational duty 
and i n  l a t e  March 1978 it  went off t o  the eastern Caprivi f o r  3 months. In 1979, a 
- 145 - 
second operational company served there as well. 
In the past 6 years the 21 Battalion has evolved from a largely auxiliary 
support unit producing instructors in administrative and artisan skills to a formation 
with a dual purpose - primarily for training, but also with an operational combat 
unit. The propaganda utility of 21 Battalion has begun to be realized, and in some 
respects so has its practical utility. Today the unit numbers perhaps 700 men, with 
prospects now for a much more rapid expansion in the use of Blacks, mostly through 
the growth and addition of regional, ethnic-based operational formations. 
As the professionalization of the 21 Battalion occurs it comes directly into 
conflict with the homelands scheme. The regionalization of Black units does little to 
solve the issue. Logically, as each ethnic group achieves "independence" soldiers 
attached to 21 Battalion or any other Black African fighting unit from that particular 
ethnic group should be demobilized from the SADF,' or reattested to the asmy of the new 
state. Presumably Blacks are to have citizenship in their ttown't homeland. South 
African Black units would be increasingly composed of non-South African nationals, 
constituting mercenaries or a foreign legion within the Republic. There is a choice 
offered in Black contracts. Members of an ethnic group gaining "independence" may be 
attested to their It own" homeland7 S forces when their homeland attains " independencett. 
Among the Venda members of the SADF, however, few exercised that option. 
SADF headquaxters is aware of the possibility of non-citizen soldiers and 
they do not like it. None the less, they plow on, assuming that no f'uture conflict 
need occur, or that a controllable force made up of "expatriates" can be structurally 
integrated into the SADF. The Byzantine emperors recognized that mercenary d e s  
must not be allowed to become ethnically homogeneous, lest they constitute a greater 
danger to their employers. They kept mercenaries divided on ethnic lines to prevent 
them from combining against government. The existence of separate racial formations 
and the regional decentralization of Black Africans (a form of group "dilution policy") 
could be seen as preventative measures facilitating White control. But organization 
(specifically ~alkanization) is only one way to control the Black forces. South 
Africa has used it, but it has also sought to control by caref'ul recruitment and 
selection. Indoctrination is a third technique. 
It must not be forgotten that South Africa's use of Blacks is a pragmatic 
response rather than a reflection of ha..rmonious , non-racial atti-hdes and relationships. 
It has never been a question of whether to oppose insurgents, but how. The use of 
Black soldiers is regarded as serving both political and military ends. It serves the 
dual purpose of steeling the community in adversity and also liberalizing that society, 
while keeping the institution being liberalized remote, so they think, from the larger 
policy. A moral climate has been created approving of the use of Black soldiers and 
the expansion of the SABF. It is, in short, an institution that is a product of 
historical and material circumstances, which White power would like to keep divorced 
from those circumstances. The talk about a "people's army" or a "people's defence 
forcett, terms making the rounds of the National Party and the SADF (22), is self- 
delusion, but it can lead to unexpected spin-offs, at least in so far as it leads to 
an acceptance of armed Blacks and admits of the relationship between military service 
and citizenship. 
In so far as the armed forces leadership are arbiters of politics, that is, 
they are one of the main pillars of authority since government hardly rests on the 
loyalty of its Black subjects, their voice cannot be ignored. Magnus M a n  occupies 
a position extremely close to P. W. Botha. The SADF is higher in policy-making 
councils than at any time in its history. The White populace sees the professionaJ. 
armed forces as an indispensable institution. And, once having achieved this exalted 
position, it may well have an effect on the polity greater than the polity's effect 
on 5t. In a way, the military has been raised to the level of a good in itself. At 
present the SADF seems to play the role as a trendsetter. That will not necessarily 
last. One can envision the SADF in the f'uture becoming damned about too large a 
proportion of the armed forces being Black, talk of "people's army'! notwithstanding. 
The s m a l l  rmmbers of Blacks i n  the Permanent Force (around 9.5 per cent) 
s ignif ies  the experimental nature of the Governmentls approach. Except f o r  the 
Namibian and homeland forces, l e s s  than one per cent of the r e s t  of the service are 
Black. Caution i s  not a subst i tute  f o r  careful thought and planning. Many of the 
decisions regarding Black uni t s  were asrived a t  post facto and were c r i s i s  oriented. 
The success of 21 Battalion, the outcome of the Transkeian dispute, and the sheet 
command and organizational confusion inherent i n  separate homeland d e s  and different 
r ac ia l  and ethnic uni t s  m a y  well prompt government to reconsider its ea r l i e r  approach 
t o  control by subdivision along t e r r i t o r i a l  and ethnic lines. They may come to  f ee l  
that  there are other ways to  accomplish the same ends. 
It i s  almost inevitable that,  as  the threat mounts, the Government w i l l  
have t o  re ly  on Blacks to  f i l l  Defence Force manpower needs. It could be tha t  i f  
Namibia should gain an independence acceptable to the outside world and to  SWAPO, and 
a measure of s t ab i l i t y  should be achieved there, a temporary break i n  the defence 
needs of South Africa might lead t o  declining usage of Black troops - a sor t  of las t -  
hired-first-fired principle. This, however, would merely be a temporary interruption 
i n  an otherwise upward sp i ra l  of military confrontation i n  the region. The Defence 
Force hierarchy and opposition White part ies  are pushing a wary Government in to  
greater use of Blacks and a l iberal izat ion i n  the terms of the i r  service and 
rermeration. Step by step t h i s  is  being done. I n  April 1978 the SADF, without 
fanfare, quietly eliminated a l l  legal  regulations re la t ing  to  r ac ia l  and sexual 
discrimination i n  the SADF. Yet, i n  practice, such "liberalizationtt  is  by no means 
complete, o r  even maxginally a real i ty.  A t  t h i s  point one need hardly be concerned 
about the ro le  of fraternization of the races a t  rank and f i l e  levels. hccept i n  the 
operational area, structures do not admit of much mixing except in  tradi t ional  super 
and subordinate roles. But such changes must be low-key: some poli t ic ians accuse 
the SADF of breaking rac ia l  laws and violat ing social customs. Although reforms are 
noteworthy, especially i n  the social context of South Africa, they w i l l  not change 
the distribution of power and control within the armed forces, and certainly not 
within the society a s  a whole. Extensive use of Black soldiers i n  Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique and Angola did l i t t l e  t o  a l t e r  the constellation of power there - indeed, 
i t  did much to  prolong the l ives  of those White regimes. 
Greater use of Blacks i n  the SADF should not surprise us. I n  its general 
outlines it i s  i n  keeping with past South African practice. But there remains the 
potential f o r  consequences which may not be foreseen. M a n y  Blacks see enlistment a s  
nothing more than an economic opportunity where few others exist.  In South Africa 
and Namibia Blacks do not function on a free labour market. Inducements can be 
provided to  f i l l  expanded recruitment quotas. To say th i s  is  not to  imply that  a 
majority of Blacks support the s t a t e  and axe willing to defend it. On the contrary, 
unscientific surveys indicate that  most Blacks are unwilling to  f ight  i n  defence of 
the Republic, with i ts  current power structure and policies. (23) The long-range 
picture looks bleak f o r  the regime. 
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